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In developing countries, links are poor among domestic communities or Internet Ser-
vice Providers (ISP). Besides international Internet channels are suddenly blocked by 
such as GS (Golden Shield) in China. Offshore business communications are involved in 
these. 
To avoid such involvement, a seamless virtual network is proposed as an international 
business communication bridging solution. This uses the so called Round Trip Time 
(RTT) based multiple thresholding differentially switched Virtual Private Network (VPN) 
bypass. The characteristics are 
(1) the use of a multiple threshold integrated differential calculus of the RTT increase, 
a sign of the block is recognized as the steep staircase increase of RTT, 
(2) followed by the immediate automatic switch to VPN having an RTT below 200ms 
and  
(3) its asymmetry, i.e. only the absolute threshold value and continuation time are used 
to determine when to switch back. 
This method is analytically and statistically evaluated as being successful (below 3% er-
rors), using around 200 cases of data on GS blocks. Furthermore, it has been validated by 
the real seamless usage in more than 20 offshore companies for three years. 
Besides response time in offshore applications, this method can also alleviate problems 
such as voice echoes and video jitters which irritate business users. These effects were 
validated analytically and by questionnaires to scores of business customers. 
Chapter 1 motivates the topic, briefly discusses potential solution approaches, and 
sketches basic ideas of the developed solution to the problem. 
Chapter 2 describes the communication problems such as governmental restrictions or 
problems in developing countries such as China, which is the reason for the inconven-
iences. Further, it describes a reference model for dependable network services especially 
for latency sensitive offshore business application. 
Chapter 3 introduces our solution method to guarantee dependable offshore application 
services. In particular, the VPN bypass link is introduced along with its characteristic 
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compared to the domestic Internet is introduces in the first part and an intelligent timing 
policy for switching it on and off in its second part. 
Chapter 4 evaluates the effects, using typical borderline examples and statistical analy-
sis. In particular, the behavior of the proposed method on non-blocked and blocked Inter-
net service is analyzed. Furthermore, the results are discussed and improvements are de-
rived accordingly. 
Chapter 5 analyses the effects on the technical quality of latency-sensitive key applica-
tions such as audio-conferencing. Then, effects to the end users are validated using this 
analysis for latency-sensitive applications and questionnaires about the quality perceived 
by the final/application user. 
Chapter 6 outlines related work, providing the detailed comparison with existing solu-
tions. Since the related work assumes a knowledge on the proposed approach to be cor-
rectly understood, this chapter is arranged at this place instead of a place in front of the 
proposed solution. Also, the paper would benefit from a more detailed comparison be-
tween existing solutions and the proposed approach. It also describes some backgrounds 
on the negative effects of latency turbulence on applications like cloud/fog computing and 
audio/web conferencing services. 
Chapter 7 summarizes the thesis by reviewing the problem, the developed solution and 




Enabling international business communication via the Internet has become an im-
portant factor for the growth of business activities in developing countries. For example, 
it has become common for offshore business in emerging countries to utilize motherland 
cloud computers as data centers for efficiency, safety and such. Smooth and efficient Web 
conferences among offshore offices and headquarters or offices in other countries are also 
important for enterprise activities. Because of the cost, they are usually accessed via the 
Internet. 
However, sometimes international bridging channels for developing countries are sud-
denly blocked. This is done by intentional actions of the local government, called GS 
(Golden Shield) in China. It is also known as “the Great Firewall” [52]. This causes busi-
ness discontinuity resulting from sudden serious degradation of network response. Such 
restriction not only targets each single IP address by TCP Reset [13]. But also it cuts the 
route to an IP address prefix that includes the target IP address. In the latter, all business 
sites located near the (usually political) target become involved in the block. 
VPN (Virtual Private Network) has been already used to avoid such governmental cen-
sorship. However, it has problems in persistent governmental censorship or blocking as 
well as its cost. Still more, manual switch to VPN takes time and is troublesome. Thus 
users often lose offshore business opportunities because of a lack of smooth international 
communications. Further, some VPNs may already be censored when they are used. 
Nobori et al. [39] try to solve this by costless volunteer VPN gateway servers and their 
collaborative detection using spy lists against governmental attack. However, despite their 
free cost, using volunteer gateway servers is not stable especially for business use. On the 
other hand, dedicated lines are expensive. 
To cope with these problems, a seamless virtual network system is proposed for inter-
national business continuity in the presence of intentional blocks. This system is based on 
our previous network-intensive method [24], using a differential VPN bypass tool. This 
method exploits the staircase waveform of network delay of intentional blocking such as 
GS. Thus, the proposed intelligent method automatically recognizes intentional blocking 
of international communication. Then, this immediately activates a VPN bypass before 
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significant response degradation is experienced by users. The intelligent routers switch the 
route to foreign addresses from the open Internet to a VPN bypass, in order to limit net-
work latency increase. Routers are placed at user’s offices. However, VPN utilization is 
limited to the block duration to avoid the VPN gateway becoming also a target of blocking. 
This method applies asymmetric criteria to decide when to activate the bypass and when to 
return to open Internet connection. Differential values of RTT (Round Trip Time) or net-
work latency are used for detecting the start of a GS block (bypassing). Meanwhile, to 
determine both the start and the end of a GS block, absolute threshold values are used. In 
particular, this Thesis concretely and formally shows the followings: 
(1) differential values of network latency can easily detect an abrupt change of RTT 
and 
(2) therefore, are also useful to alleviate Voice echo and jitters caused by abrupt change 
of RTT. 
This Thesis includes newly extended parts of our network-intensive base system. The 
extension (the novel parts) are its conceptual features and/or methods focused on business 
continuity. These include multiple differential thresholds, evaluation by questionnaires and 
borderline cases, as well as statistical analysis. Here the types of business carried out 
across international borders include metal material export, import of finely processed steel, 
manufacturing and sales of apparel, etc. The needed type of continuity is the seamless 
transmission of voice, image, video data as well as text. These are necessary for animation 
pictures, multimedia catalogue, or high precision design documents accompanied with 
high quality vocal explanation in Web or video conferences. Applications such as Auto-
CAD, Polycom RealPresence, and various cloud services were needed for the business 
types mentioned above. These applications usually access cross-border service interfaces 
such as those of video conference whose servers are in the motherlands. 
The proposed method provides an application-intensive seamless communication 
bridge to developing countries or communities. It is thoroughly evaluated. Its capability of 
providing continuity is improved at the business application level. This improvement fo-
cuses on latency-sensitive services such as audio /Web conferencing. Especially, the pro-
posed method newly improved by integration of multiple differential thresholds. This alle-
viates not only response time in Web conferences but also throughput in business file 
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transfer, voice echo problems, and jitters in voice and video. Voice echo and jitters often 
and significantly irritate business users. Further, this paper newly validates our method’s 
effects to such application level international communications. This is realized by analyti-
cal evaluations as well as questionnaires to our customers of 24 companies in their off-
shore business application usage. 
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2. COMMUNICATION GAPS WITHIN 
AND WITH DEVELOPING 
COMMUNITIES 
 
Business continuity was often hindered in operating IT systems especially in accessing 
cloud computers. This chapter describes China’s communication problems. 
 
2.1 Communication problems in Operating Distributed 
Systems in China 
Although over 500 million Internet users exist in China, its Internet suffers from the 
peering problem. This problem is sometimes referred as “North-South problem” or 
“North-South Divide” [12]. Internet exchange between China Telecom and China Unicom 
is very narrow, though both are ones of the world largest carriers. The quality, speed, and 
stability of communication over such poor link are often deteriorate sharply. If congested, 
more than 1000ms latency happens even in the same city [40]. The connection between an 
ISP in China and one in Japan is often faster than that between nodes both in China. The 
former is much more stable. This problem is serious for a company that runs a distributed 
system. It is because clients in multiple offices are linked to servers at data centers. For 
example, in southern China, there are many clients of branch offices. Clients of such offic-
es are often connected to multiple ISPs. Some of them are connected to China Telecom 
and others are connected to China Unicom even though residing the same city. They ac-
cess through the servers or data center at their headquarters connected to China Telecom. 
More than 1sec. latency mentioned above causes even malfunctions of the distributed sys-
tems built using application servers such as MetaFrame [35]. 
Regulations imposed by the Chinese government are also problematic. This is a politi-
cal rather than technological issue. Because of the regulation by China State Council Di-
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rective No. 273 [11], de facto global standard products for data security cannot be used in 
China. Thus, data centers need to be in mother countries for security reasons. Client com-
puters in China need to communicate with each other via servers in Japan. 
Furthermore, the Ministry of Public Security division of the Chinese government oper-
ates a censorship and surveillance project. This is called GS (Golden Shield) whose fire-
wall is known as “the Great Firewall” [52]. It is known that the censor system blocks ser-
vices such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube regarded as harmful by the government. 
Web sites carrying political messages against the country are also blocked. It is considered 
to be for the purpose of thought control. However, this regulation or network restriction 
causes bad influence or collateral effects to business traffic as well as to daily life. For ex-
ample, international communication links for business are often blocked as described later. 
Such incidents become frequent around the time of large political ceremonies like National 
People’s Congress. 
Below are some of the techniques used by GS [13]: 
 DNS Poisoning: GS intentionally poisons its DNS caches with wrong addresses. 
 Blocking Access to IPs: GS can block access to certain IP addresses. This prevents 
people from accessing a certain forbidden IP address directly. This technique also 
blocks other services located at the same address as the target (shared hosting). 
 Analyzing URLs:  GS scans URLs and block connections if they contain sensitive 
keywords. 
 Inspecting and Filtering Packets: GS uses “Deep Packet Inspection (DPI)” to exam-
ine unencrypted packets, looking for sensitive content. 
 Resetting Connections: When GS blocks access, it will block communication be-
tween both computers by sending a “reset packet.” GS essentially lies/tells to both 
computers that the connection was reset. Thus, they can’t talk to each other. 
 Blocking VPNs: In late 2012, GS started trying to block VPNs. GS identifies en-
crypted traffic and kills VPN connections. 
These blocks can be identified, using a tool such as “Great Firewall of China” or the 
Website Pulse test as Fig. 1 [53]. Below are the results of the analysis for the human rights 
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site. The site www.hrw.org is not accessible from mainland China but easily reachable 
from the US (Fig. 1). The US site’s short response time of the Chinese DNS suggests DNS 
poisoning. The IP address resolves to an address in Europe. This address in turn is shared 
by the Chinese domain www.haosf.com.cn. 
Due to such blocking caused by governmental restriction, multiple paths to reach Japan 
are prepared. Clients can choose the best path according to the situation. However, some 
are still problematic for business. For example, manual bypassing on GS blockage causes 
discontinuity in business communication. Others such as dedicated lines are expensive. 
VPN bypasses can also be used to avoid this. However, always using VPN services has 
problems with a risk of governmental restriction as well as with its cost. Though Nobori et 
al. [39] try to solve these through volunteer VPN services equipped with the detection of 




Fig. 1: Website Pulse: Censored Website Monitoring (status: connect() timed out!) Service 
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2.2 Alternative Connection Path for offshore business System 
in Developing Communities 
The types of offshore business carried out in China or across the border include 
(1) metal material export and finely processed steel import, 
(2) the design and production of automobile parts, 
(3) food manufacturing and sales, 
(4) manufacturing and sales of apparel, etc. 
The needed continuity type is the seamless transmission of texts, voice, image, and vid-
eo data. These are indispensable for animated videos, multimedia catalogue, or high preci-
sion design documents accompanied with high quality vocal explanation in Web or Video 
conferences. Applications such as AutoCAD, Polycom RealPresence, and various cloud 
service are needed for the above mentioned types of business. They access service inter-
faces such as video conference. 
Such interfaces should be cross-border, that is, their servers should be deployed in the 
motherlands as shown in Fig. 2. It is because accessing large-volume data as well as data 
security in real time is needed. This cannot be satisfied without exploiting cloud services 
across the border. This is because of communication problems such as North-South Prob-
lem and governmental restrictions discussed in the previous section. 
 
Fig. 2: Our cloud-based system provided in China 
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Fig. 2 illustrates the architecture or framework of such a business system. It uses cloud 
computers or data centers in the motherland. For the sake of simplicity, our framework 
only assumes two offices in China. In real cases, there are much more offices involved. 
Further in China, even each office (Office 1, Office 2) of the same company is often con-
nected to different ISP, (ISP-A, ISP-B, respectively). The exchange of data among these 
ISPs is poor. Thus, offshore offices of various Japanese companies in China are connected 
through data centers in Japan. This makes our system an offshore cloud system shared by 
multiple companies. 
Under this system model for offshore business, a lot of important data are stored in the 
mother country or Japan. Headquarters of companies and data centers are connected to the 
Internet in Japan. Application software also runs in those unrestricted places. Conversely, 
virtual terminal environments such as MetaFrame require data and programs to be placed 
inside a single server or a data center. Our framework allows these to be distributed among 
different places. They are connected via seamless, stable and dependable communication 
infrastructure in Japan. This feature provides flexibility in system deployment. This is of-
ten required in dynamically-changing situations and evolving economies of developing 
countries. Each database of each office or company can be deployed in each different serv-
er in Japan. Some database copies of such a distributed data center for heterogeneous com-
pany offices can be deployed in different servers. Such a remote distributed data center 
shared by multiple companies provides a more stable and dependable storage infrastruc-
ture. This is taken as a kind of cloud systems. 
However, the serious issue in this architecture is the GS mentioned before. This causes 
the instability of the international Internet connection. It is not foreseeable when such con-
nections become blocked. Furthermore, the restriction is done not only to each single IP 
address but also to the group of IP addresses. The former blocks by issuing TCP Reset to 
the IP address [13]. Meanwhile, the latter shutdowns /blocks the colleagues near the target 
or some groups of IP addresses such as subnets or international channels. Business sites 
(especially cloud computers) nearby or surrounding the (usually more political) target site 
are involved in this GS blocking. Such GS blocks cause a serious risk of business interrup-
tion [2]. However, this is owing to the involvement in sudden restriction of international 
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channels for accessing offshore cloud systems mentioned above. Such business continuity 
disruption is a collateral effect of an action having different objectives. Namely, objectives 
are those to block people’s accessing politically inconvenient data or sites. The proposed 
method provides seamless dependable communication bridges for offshore business sys-
tems as modelled in Fig. 2. 
16 
3. DEPENDABLE COMMUNICATION 
BRIDGE FOR OFFSHORE BUSINESS 
SYSTEM 
To solve the problem mentioned above, an intelligent bypass method using VPN is 
proposed. The aim is the dependable communication bridges whose configuration is also 
illustrated in Fig. 2. This automatically switches between the ordinary Internet and VPN 
contracted considering bandwidth and reasonable cost. This is done seamlessly without 
users’ consciousness even on sudden GS restriction to international communication. A 
proxy server or VPN Gate server as shown in the bottom of Fig. 2 accepts connections 
from office’s intelligent VPN routers and automatically controls the IP packet flow. The 
server relays them to its counterpart connected to the Internet in Japan or offshore cloud 
computers. This achieves both the effectiveness of communication and the immunity (or 
avoidance) from GS blocks. The proposed intelligent bypass method dynamically changes 
the path to send IP packets. An intelligent VPN router in Fig. 2 uses this method. It ordi-
narily sends them to a regional ISP (i.e. ISP-A for Office 1). No sooner it recognizes any 
sign of governmental network blockage, it changes the path to the VPN Gateway Server. 
This is done characteristically using differential calculus. On recognizing the end of GS 
blocks, it switches the path back to the ordinary internet (i.e. ISP-A) again. 
This chapter concretely explains the proposed method and its rationale. Further, in the 
next chapter, the effect is estimated more quantitatively as well as validated statistically. 
 
3.1 VPN Bypass Link for Stable Offshore Communication 
Internet routing protocols such as OSPF and BGP select routings. These are based on 
some criteria such as minimizing the number of hops considering static band-width. How-
ever, his does not work on intentional disconnections by attackers such as those of GS. 
This type of countermeasure cannot form reasonable alternative routes and packets will be 
significantly delayed. Users facing such network system disruption have to prepare com-
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munication bypass links to avoid deteriorated networks. This reasonable bypass for keep-
ing the QoS or network response, is achieved through switching to VPN by considering its 
bandwidth, cost, etc. The routes through the routers/IXs at or close to the restricted interna-
tional communication sites (Golden Shield Project in Fig. 2) will be very congested espe-
cially in case of GS attacks.  However, China side bypass links from user’s offices to 
VPN gateway are connected through routers/IXs such as IX-A (for ISP-A) or IX-B (for 
ISP-A). These routers are far from the restricted sites. Further, North-South problems do 
not happen since IX-A and ISP-A (also IX-B and ISP-B) belong to the same AS. Contract-
ed VPN providers assure the performance between VPN gateway and Japan. Thus, inde-
pendently of GS attacks, the bypass link is stable and has better RTT than Internet. This is 
shown by lower lines (bypass link) in エラー! 参照元が見つかりません。 and エラ
ー! 参照元が見つかりません。 or RTT in the third column of Table II. 
 
 






Table I: Increase ratio (RTT IR) on non-GS in Fig. 3 
Time (hour) RTT (ms) RTT increase ratio (%) 
10:06:00 217 -0.91 
10:12:00 225 3.69 
10:18:00 239   6.22 
10:24:00 253   (Maximum) 5.86 
10:30:00 248 -1.98 
⁞ ⁞ ⁞ 
21:12:00 224 10.3 
 
 














14:00:00 188 119 -0.53 
14:06:00 269 121 43.1 
14:12:00 330 125 22.7 
⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ 
15:18:00 390 123 20.0 
15:24:00 447 130 14.6 
⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ 
16:30:00 499 135 13.2 
16:36:00 578 133 15.8 
⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ 
17:42:00 702 149 24.9 




Fig. 5: RTT on typical single step GS 
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Table III: mmm RTT increase ratio (RTT IR) on GS in エラー! 参照元が見つかりません。 
hh:mm:ss RTT (ms) RTT IR (%) 
0:06:00 350 -2.2 
⁞ ⁞ (over 200ms) ⁞ 
2:00:00 201 -9.5 
2:06:00 189 -6.0 
⁞ ⁞ ⁞ (30minutes) 
2:36:00 136 -3.1 
⁞ ⁞ ⁞ 
13:30:00 149 2.8 
13:36:00 250 67.8 
13:42:00 278 11.2 
13:48:00 299 7.6 
13:54:00 378 26.4 
14:00:00 485 28.3 
⁞ ⁞ ⁞ 
 
Without attacks or intentional disconnections, users would be better served using Inter-
net connection rather than VPN, because of cost or stability. As shown in Fig. 2, intelligent 
VPN routers continuously monitor the behavior of network services. Then it selects the 
path through which to forward the packets for stability and efficiency in running applica-
tion programs. The routers placed at user’s offices switch routes to/from VPN contracted 
by each company to ensure QoS or network response and only during regulation not to be 
censored. By the way, the primary motivation for the proposed method as opposed to ex-
isting tunneling methods is to improve the performance (response time) of data transfers 
through clouds in mother countries, with low cost, especially during the GS blocks. There-
fore, the anonymity of users is not necessarily guaranteed except between VPN gates (in 
China and mother countries) default supported by VPN providers. 
 
3.2 Intelligent Switch for seamless virtual network 
The timing of the switch to VPN is very important for stable communication within 
distributed offshore information systems. Intelligent VPN routers have to recognize the 
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onset of a GS block before users are aware of network deterioration. GS blocks happen 
abruptly and cause a business activity stop. According to our experience, the behavior of 
the Internet services is very different between unintentional malfunctioning and intention-
al attack. Disruptions caused by the former primarily affect the dropped packet ratio, 
while the latter gives away some telling signs of the onset in terms of latency (the turn-
around time: RTT). In the case of GS, network latency increases following a staircase 
pattern. Such latency causes throughput degradations resulting from “ack” of TCP and 
jitters (fluctuations) because of abrupt/sharp increasing waveform. They also hinder our 
distributed information systems. 
Taking these considerations into account, switching to/from VPN bypass is performed 
by our proposed intelligent VPN routers as follows. 
(Step 1) Every 15 seconds, the router sends ICMP Echo Request to the offshore 
servers used by applications in the office via the open Internet and VPNs. And, 
it records the turn-around time (RTT) for the corresponding ICMP Echo Reply 
to return (ICMP is forwarded by the proxy in Fig. 2). 
(Step 2) The router calculates the RTT increase ratio (first derivative) by the ex-
pression as shown below. Rule1: if it is higher than a preset value of differen-
tial threshold tdf % per difference width tw seconds and the RTT absolute val-
ue is longer than starting threshold ts milliseconds, GS mode (initially reset) is 
set. Then at once, the communication path of offshore computers is switched 
from the Internet to a VPN bypass (which is active namely, whose RTT is less 
than 200 ms). Denoting by RTTC: the current RTT and by RTTB: the RTT of 




(Step 3) The router continues to record RTT of the Internet. Rule2: when RTT be-
ing below a preset threshold called ending threshold te (milliseconds) contin-
ues over continuation time tc (minutes) during GS mode on, GS mode is reset 
and the router changes the communication path back to the Internet. 
Threshold values are selected, used, and adjusted as follows. 
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In (Step 2) generally as a range, differential threshold tdf= 20~40% per difference 
width tw=15~360 sec coupled with starting threshold ts= 120~200ms. Specifically, tw is 
set empirically first (e.g. 360 sec in the year 2015). Then, tdf is selected as “the minimum 
value of RTT increase ratio per tw at GS onset (e.g. 43% in エラー! 参照元が見つかり
ません。 in the year 2015) - margin (usually 10 %)”. Thus tdf was 30% in 2015. Mean-
while, ts is selected as “the minimum value of RTT at GS onset (e.g. 150ms in 2015) - 
margin (usually 10ms)”. Thus, RTT absolute value threshold at GS start, namely, the 
starting threshold ts was 140ms in 2015. They are used in Rule1. Using real data, such 
parameters are checked every season (every 3 months) to be adjusted for the real use. 
In (Step 2) ending threshold te=200ms and continuation time tc=30min are selected by 
the maximum RTT and its duration on non-GS days and adjusted every season for real 
use in Rule2. 
We remark that practically speaking, this control is enabled only when the network is 
being used. Furthermore, when little or no traffic is observed, e.g. during late nights, they 
can disable switching. The aim is to limit pointless use of bypass routes. A major feature 
of our method is the asymmetric control of path selection between (Step 2) and (Step 2). 
Namely, differential values and absolute values of RTT are used for switching to bypass. 
Meanwhile, only absolute values combined with the elapsed /continuation time are used 
for switching back to the Internet. This is obtained from our experience with the systems 
operated in China for several years. Below, we provide the rationale of our method. 
It is straight and usual to switch paths once the RTT increases over an absolute thresh-
old. Practically, however, it does not work. It is because Internet traffic in peak hours 
slow-downs physiologically or comparatively gradually. In China, for example, the Inter-
net becomes congested in the evening almost every day. Thus, a simple rule specifying an 
absolute threshold has the following problems. For the rule, “if RTT is more than X 
msec., it is a GS block”:  
 (RTT on non-GS) explains it. The table explains how false positive errors occur, if 
threshold X is comparatively low (e.g. below 250ms). For instance, if threshold X is 
220/250ms, this rule takes ordinary congestions for a GS block when RTT is 225/253ms 
at 10:12:00 (10:24:00).  
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 and エラー! 参照元が見つかりません。 show these mistakes can continue al-
most all the day (from 10:12:00 or 10:24:00 till 21:12:00). Meanwhile, Table III (RTT 
on GS) explains false negatives: noticing the block when too late if threshold X is slightly 
high (e.g. over 250ms). Namely, if threshold X is 270ms, this rule cannot find a GS block 
until RTT is 330ms. Table II shows this. If threshold X is 255ms, the rule cannot find a 
GS block until RTT is 278ms. Table III shows it. These RTTs make business users easily 
experience network latency. Such experience causes a business activity stop. 
To distinguish daily congestion from GS blocks, we rather look at the first derivative 
of RTT. GS blocks introduce steep staircase increases of network latency. Meanwhile 
daily congestion causes a lower rate of RTT changes. The Internet slowdown caused by a 
natural disaster remains local. It does not show the sharp and rather long and/or multiple 
staircase RTT increase for international communications. This is typical of the onset 
(start) of intentional blocks such as GS. Based on this insight, the proposed method uses a 
first derivative threshold. This is coupled with an absolute (or fixed/static) value thresh-
old, rather than thresholding absolute value only. The method can be expected to predict 
such GS blocks more effectively. 
On the contrary, GS block end does not show such tendency. From our practical expe-
rience, RTT does not decrease so abruptly at the end of GS as it increases at the onset. 
This happens because a large amount of traffic flows in each Internet route when it re-
open at the end of GS block. This results in the Internet congestion and the RTT does not 
decrease so rapidly. In practice, switching back is not as urgent as avoiding the onset of 
blockage, which halts business operations. Thus, we use simply RTT itself to switch back, 
instead of its differential value. 
The proposed method uses Round Trip Time of ICMP Echo (RTT) rather than other 
parameters such as packet-loss rate. The rationale behind it is as follows. At the beginning 
of an intentional network block by GS, some routes are shut down. However, packets can 
be re-routed to the ones still open. In reality, pings namely ICMP Echo packets from our 
intelligent routers to the open Internet are not dropped. They come back without disap-
pearing. Thus, the onset of the GS block can be easily missed if packet-loss is used. Even-
tually, packet-loss ratio cannot show the onset of (GS) blocks. Meanwhile RTT increase 
ratio reflects it much better because the RTT increase at the onset of GS blocks is abrupt. 
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エラー! 参照元が見つかりません。 shows the RTT of an ordinary day when no 
block was observed. Neither staircase nor abrupt RTT increase was detected. Even the 
maximum RTT was around 250ms. Open (public) Internet could be used all the day with-
out significant delay or without business stop. However, this is one of confusing or bor-
derline cases. Indeed, the RTT increased as the time of day passed. It continued to be 
mostly more than 200ms during 8:30-22:30 as shown in エラー! 参照元が見つかりま
せん。. Rule 1 without RTT differential calculus would have taken this as GS blocks 
continuing 14 hours, even if the absolute starting threshold ts is set as 200ms. However, 
the switch to VPN bypass did not occur owing to differential calculus of RTT. The differ-
ential value of RTT did not increase so much. Even the maximum one was 10.3 % at 
21:12:00 in  
. This is much less than 30% of tdf. 
Some readers may wonder why automatic switching based on RTT outperforms using 
the VPN link all the time. There are two reasons for this: first, permanently using VPN is 
costly. Our VPN bypass can partly use a leased line when the Internet is congested. Sec-
ond, identifying and attacking the VPN gateway address should be avoided. Reducing the 
probability of successful sampling alleviates the chance of automatic entropy-based iden-
tification of VPN traffic. Thus, we need to use the VPN only for emergencies. 
Each red line in エラー! 参照元が見つかりません。 and エラー! 参照元が見
つかりません。 shows the RTT of the Internet on various real GS blocks. On GS 
blocks, the bypass was switched and the resulting RTT of the bypass remained stable be-
low 150ms. This is shown by blue lined Bypass Link of エラー! 参照元が見つかりま
せん。 and エラー! 参照元が見つかりません。 (the third column digits of Table 
II). 
As a result of differential calculation of the RTT increase (Step 2), our intelligent rout-
er recognized the onset of GS. It was done at the early part of the staircase. Immediately 
and automatically, it switched to the stable bypass before offshore users notice the net-
work latency.  Once GS block was removed it smoothly switched back to the Internet 
(Step 2). 
In order to analyze the behavior of RTT of ICMP Echo packets in the Internet depicted 
in Fig. 6 when GS occurred, a simulation model was developed on ns-3 [37][57]. The ns-
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3 is a discrete-event network simulator for Internet systems. Though the mechanism is not 
disclosed the case of each international communication channel being step-wisely 
blocked (through almost perfect shaping etc.) by the governmental authority is simulated. 
Here, speculating from the phenomenon of RTT increasing in staircase form shown in 
Figure 9, the followings are assumed in the simulator. 1) Each channel is blocked to 
check the suspected sites step by step. 2) Some international communication channels are 
blocked and totally international communication is limited by authorities. 3) The latency 
or speed of each international communication channel is assumed to be different. 4) Each 
channel is blocked by the communication equipment (hardware) or the routing table. 
As shown by figure 7, the simulation results showed (1) the abrupt stepwise increase on 
GS due to net detour and (2) it seems effectively detected by RTT first derivatives, which 
is a long sequence of numbers close to zero immediately followed by a short period of 
number close to one, which immediately decreases to almost zero again. 
 
 




Fig. 7: Simulation results 
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4. EVALUATION 
4.1 Evaluation on real GS block and non-GS data 
This chapter evaluates (Step 1) through (Step 2) especially Rule1 and 2 of the method 
proposed in the previous chapter. Section 4.1 individually but concretely evaluates the 
effect of differential calculus. Only typical but somewhat borderline cases are used 
though selected out of more than 100 datasets on real GS block, business continuity as 
well as cost/safety (due to less bypassing time) are evaluated. As to the threshold values, 
the actual ones during the year 2015 are used as follows. Namely, differential threshold: 
tdf=30% per difference width: tw=360 sec, and starting threshold: ts=140ms, ending 
threshold: te=200ms, continuation time: tc=30min. GS blocking usually happens every 
two or three days. GS blockings happened more than 150 times in the year 2015. General-
ly, the RTT increases sharply and/or abruptly at the onset of GS blocks. The increase 
curve is shaping steep staircases of 1-7 steps. 
As for business continuity effects, エラー! 参照元が見つかりません。 shows the 
RTT graph on a typical GS attack. This graph has four steps of staircases observed at 
14:06:00, 15:18:00, 16:36:00 and 17:42:00. Table II quantitatively shows four tuples of 
RTT and RTT increases. They are (269ms, 43.1%), (390ms, 20.0%), (578ms, 15.8%), 
and (702ms, 24.9%), respectively at each of those four steps. Utilizing Rule1 in (Step 2) 
with ts, tdf, and tw mentioned above, the proposed system successfully detected the GS 
attack. It was at 14:06:00 having the tuple (269ms, 43.1%). This is because 269ms is 
longer than starting threshold ts =140ms and 43.1% is higher than differential threshold 
tdf= 30% per difference width tw=360sec. Then, it automatically and immediately 
switched from international channels of the open Internet to VPN bypass. It was in time 
for avoiding heavy response delay such as 330ms at 14:12:00. The RTT was kept below 
150ms of bypass link RTT. The RTT is shown in the lower parts of エラー! 参照元が
見つかりません。 and the third column of Table II. 
However, this case namely GS detection at 269ms of RTT is somewhat borderline. 
The RTT increases close to 300ms, clients sometimes notice the access deterioration. 
Though a very little, clients may notice what happened in the Internet communications. 
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Anyway, this resulted in an almost seamless communication bridge. Users could continue 
their business operations.  
As to another business continuity effect, エラー! 参照元が見つかりません。 
shows several sudden RTT changes especially due to GS attacks. However, as shown 
above, the network was successfully virtualized in case the proposed differential method 
is used. Meanwhile, if systems wait for RTT exceeding the absolute threshold (e.g. 270ms 
with tw kept and no tdf considered), users would experience deterioration. That is, RTT 
abruptly increased from 269ms at 14:06:00 to 330ms at 14:12:00. This is shown in Table 
II. Thus, judging only based on the absolute threshold is unstable. Using the first deriva-
tive, systems could predict GS effectively before users are aware of significant latency.  
エラー! 参照元が見つかりません。 shows the RTT graph of another typical bor-
derline case having just one-step (type of) GS attack. This explains a business continuity 
effect furthermore. Table III indicates the abrupt RTT increase at the attack (GS block) 
time. Again using Rule1, at 13:36:00 our system recognized the GS block. Namely it de-
tected the abrupt RTT increase (RTT increase ratio 67.8%). This is higher than differen-
tial threshold tdf =30%. At this time, RTT was 250ms, which is more than starting 
threshold ts (= 140ms). Then it immediately switched to the VPN bypass. The RTT be-
came around 150ms of Bypass Link RTT as mentioned above. Again this is a borderline 
case. When RTT becomes 250ms, users may experience the network latency. However, 
only a little if such a case happens. Thus users could continue business.  
As to VPN bypass link duration, the time to return to the open Internet was at 2:36:00 
in Table III for エラー! 参照元が見つかりません。. At that time, VPN bypass ended 
according to Rule2. This is because RTT between 189ms-136ms which is less than the 
ending threshold te= 200ms, continued from 2:06:00 to 2:36:00 which is more than the 
continuation time tc=30min. This switched back to VPN bypass again at 13:36:00 on de-
tecting GS block. The day had two GS blocks shown in エラー! 参照元が見つかりま
せん。 (digital data in Table III). The VPN bypass link duration was confined within 11 
(= 24-13) hours (ignoring the next day). 
Again concerning VPN bypass link duration,  
 shows the RTT data of a non-GS day. However, this is also a borderline (confusing) 
case. RTT reached a maximum value of 253ms at 10:24:00. Tuples of RTT and its in-
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crease ratio on each of large ones were as follows. Namely, (217ms, 3.69 %) at 10:12:00, 
(239ms, 6.22 %) at 10:18:00, (253ms, 5.86 %) at 10:24:00, and (224ms, 10.3 %) at 
10:30:00 as shown in  
. None of these was more than 30 % in RTT increase ratio. Thus, even on such a con-
gested day or a borderline case, VPN bypassing did not occur owing to our method ex-
ploiting differential calculus of RTT. Indeed, RTT exceeded 250ms. But users’ experienc-
ing of network latency and business discontinuation due to GS block did not happen. 
 
4.2 Discussion 
As another borderline or confusing case, the RTT increase ratio sometimes decreases 
at the onset of GS blocks. This is due to the bandwidth (namely, speed) increase of inter-
national channels. Decrease of the temporal or periodic (e.g. decrease every early morn-
ing) traffic volume also has influence. Anyway, there often occurs around a half of an 
ordinary step rise (usually 100ms or more). 
 
Fig. 8: RTT on GS (false-negative error if measured per 30ms) 
 
Table IV: RTT increase ratio on GS of Fig. 8 (false-negative error if measured per 30ms) 
RTT (ms) Increase ratio (%) per 30ms Increase ratio (%) per 90ms 
177 4.7 26.4 























































195 10.2 31.8 
⁞ ⁞ ⁞ 
320 1.6 5.3 
 
If such a small step rise of RTT as continues successively, our method may not be able 
to detect the onset of GS. For example, if RTT increases as follows: 135ms -> 175ms -> 
220ms -> 280ms, differential threshold tdf does not exceed 30 % and the switch to VPN 
cannot occur. Such cases can happen when the neighbor international channels are suc-
cessively blocked and the international channel currently being used is abruptly but short-
ly or half-way delayed by packets from the neighbors. However, such (false negative) 
errors occurred only four times at most out of 159 GS blocks in the year 2015. The error 
rate was 2.5%. 
A histogram when the proposed method detected the onset of GS blocks was made for 
the purpose of statistical and more formal analysis. Around forty examples were used. 
The average: m was 222ms. The standard deviation: s was 27ms. The histogram was ap-
proximately Gaussian. The average is almost equal to the median 220ms, the average 
standard deviation is about 25 ms. The graph of RTT at the y-axis and time at the x-axis is 
almost symmetric and follows the Gaussian distribution 












with 𝜇 being the expectancy value and 𝜎2 being the variance. The probability over m + 
2*s is less than 2.5% in statistical estimation theory. Thus (m=222, s=27) means less than 
2.5% of GS blocks is estimated to be detected at longer than 276ms (=222+27*2) of RTT 
when users sometimes feel GS. Namely, the statistically estimated error rate is less than 
2.5%. This is almost coincident with the error results in 2015 since the number of false 
negative errors was 4 among 159 times of GS blocks. Therefore, the probability of GS 
block detection at more than 303ms (m + 3*s =222+27*3) of RTT when business users 
usually feel GS is estimated less than 0.15%, almost 0. Thus, the proposed method can 
keep business continuity. 
Meanwhile, assuming the absolute threshold 250ms only was used for GS block detec-
tion, a histogram was made too. This histogram was also approximately Gaussian (sym-
metric and average: 304ms (303.5ms) almost equal to median: 304.3ms). The standard 
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deviation was 23ms. Since the probability over m + s is more than 15% in statistical esti-
mation, more than 15% (24 errors among 159 times of GS blocks) is estimated to be de-
tected at longer than 327ms (m+s=304+23) of RTT. Since RTT becomes longer than 
300ms business users can be easily aware of GS and business discontinuities happen. 
Using only the threshold: ts=200ms, the average was 245ms (median = 246ms) and the 
standard deviation was 14ms. Therefore, more than 15% (24 times among 159 times of 
GS blocks) was estimated to be detected at longer than 259ms (m+s=245+14) of RTT. 
 
 
Fig. 9: RTT on GS (false-negative error if measured per 15ms) 
 
Table V: RTT increase ratio on GS of Fig. 8 (false-negative error if measured per 15ms) 
RTT (ms) Increase ratio (%) per 15 ms Increase ratio (%) per 30 ms 
159 27.2 33.6 
198 24.5 58.4 
⁞ ⁞ ⁞ 
220 10.6 17.6 
259 17.7 30.2 





Fig. 10: RTT on an ordinary day (false-positive error) 
 
 
Table VI: RTT increase on non-GS of Fig. 10 (false-positive error) 
RTT (ms) Increase ratio (%) per 30ms Increase ratio (%) per 90ms 
148 23.3 28.7 
155 14.8 32.5 
162 9.5 35.0 
178 14.8 50.8 
⁞ ⁞ ⁞ 
190 5.6 58.3 
187 1.1 38.5 
185 -2.6 25.0 
 
Since RTT becomes so longer than 259ms, business users can become aware of GS 
and business discontinuities happen. Especially, in this case of using only ts (=200ms) for 
GS block detection, bypass is switched almost all day. This can be readily known from 
エラー! 参照元が見つかりません。 (quantitatively  
) on a non-GS but congested day. There are many such days (e.g. every three days) as 
shown in both Fig. 1 and エラー! 参照元が見つかりません。 in China.  
These results show our system can virtualize offshore information access routes or 
seamlessly connect international channels. Clients do not experience significant latency 
hindering their business. GS occurs around three times per week. エラー! 参照元が見
つかりません。 and エラー! 参照元が見つかりません。 are similar in their steep 
staircase shapes, though the number of the step is different. Our approach focuses on 
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steep or sharp staircase increase in RTT. It is effective to quickly predict GS blocks, as 
shown by the data of  
 trough Table III and the statistical analysis mentioned above. Indeed, the proposed 
method well predicted the onset (start) of GS blocks at the sufficiently early timing of the 
RTT stepwise increase. This was shown by the following two facts: 1) RTT increase ratio 
becomes more than 30% on a day having GS blocks as in Table II and Table III) RTT 
increase ratio is less than 30% on a day having no GS as in  
. Such prediction was useful to keep business communications stable. 
4.3 Improvement by multiple threshold values integration 
Recently, the interval between each staircase step has become shorter. It changed from 
several hours to tens of minutes. As well, each step’s height has become smaller (e.g. less 
than 30% of RTT increase ratio) as in Table IV (corresponding to Fig. 8). 
In reality, RTT increase ratio per (tw=) 30ms in Table IV is much less than (tdf=) 30% 
(even the maximum value is 11.1%). Never the less, RTT in Table IV becomes 320ms. 
This makes it difficult to predict the onset of blocks before 300ms of RTT more than 
which users experience delay. We can simply lessen the threshold of the first derivative. 
However, it causes false positives too often, misjudging as blocks despite the absence of 
GS. 
To avoid this false-positive error, we propose the integration method of multiple 
thresholds of derivatives per various intervals. This is such as OR combination of 25 % 
per 15 seconds, 30% per 30 seconds, and 35% per 90 seconds. Due to such threshold in-
tegration (a sort of simple sensor fusion), our system can detect GS blocks before users 
notice intolerable network latency such as more than 300ms of RTT. For example, the 
RTT is 191ms (37.4% per 90ms: over 35% in Table IV for Fig. 8) and 159ms, perfectly 
198ms (58.4% per 30ms: over 30% in Table V for Fig. 9). 
Meanwhile, even on non-GS (Fig. 10), our system switches when RTT is 178ms (in 
Table VI). However, 30 minutes later it switches back. In case of non-GS shown in Fig. 
10 (エラー! 参照元が見つかりません。 also), RTT is usually below 200-300ms all 
day.  Thus, it switches back by the rule of Step 3 “switch back if RTT is below ending 
threshold: te for longer than continuation time: tc (=30 minutes)”. 
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Even if no GS sign, it is useful to detect abrupt /sharp RTT increases and switch to by-
pass. Such sharp RTT increases often cause jitters (fluctuations). Only jitters can irritate 
business users in Web conferences (voice, video) and such. Thus, these false-positive 
errors become fortunate errors. Of course, it is a little harmful to shorten the VPN bypass-
ing period against censoring. But it is useful to cope with sharp increase of network laten-
cy annoying business users in their usage of latency-sensitive applications. Still more, 
such miss-switched (false-positive error) duration or occurrence can be easily adjusted. 
For example, ending threshold te (maximum RTT on non-GS days) can be adjusted be-
tween 200-300ms. Further, the continuation time (elapsed time threshold): tc can be re-
laxed a little more between 15-90 minutes. 
Our evaluation showed that differentially switched VPN enables dependable offshore 
information systems. In these systems, clients of offshore offices in China can stably ac-
cess servers in Japan even on GS. Thus, offshore users can continue business without 
experiencing quality deterioration of access to motherland servers. Successful usages of 
more than fifty offices over 3 years also validated such effects. Our intelligent router’s 
differential prediction was combined with the immediate automatic switch to VPN by-




5. EVALUATION OF OFFSHORE 
APPLICATION SUPPORT QUALITY 
 
5.1 Application Quality Evaluation by Analysis 
Web/audio conferences are important for offshore business information systems. For 
example, VoIP communication in audio conferences is increasingly widespread on the 
global Net. However, VoIP voice quality suffers in critically non-isochronous environ-
ments showing high RTT variance. Intentional governmental restrictions such as GS can 
cause such a quality loss by sharp /steep staircase RTT increase. 
In order to alleviate this quality loss, many algorithms have been proposed to recog-
nize and eliminate acoustic echo and noise. The performance of some echo cancellation 
algorithms is analyzed in critically non-isochronous environments. Such analysis shows 
PBEC is effective if the size of the packets taken into account remains above a threshold 
[5]. PBEC is Packet-based Echo Canceller approach. The joint adoption of PBEC and of 
an advanced Jitter Buffer is also useful. 
Indeed, GS blocks cause abrupt increase of the RTT. But, our intelligent VPN router 
for our bypassing system can recognize GS at the early stage before GS blocks increase 
RTT drastically. Namely, the network is switched to VPN bypass so that the RTT can 
remain around that of VPN (150ms). The WeChat system [54] is permitted and usually 
used in China where GS blocks occur. Such systems or gateways have Echo Canceller 
and sufficient buffer for strengthening the Echo Canceller. This kind of Echo Canceller 
perfectly guarantees the successful echo-cancelation if RTT is below 200ms. Further, it 
mostly guarantees if RTT is below 300ms. 
The proposed VPN bypassing method guarantees below 270ms of RTT or so. There-
fore, neither delay nor echoes /jitters can almost be expected in audio /Web conference. 





5.2 Application Quality Evaluation by Questionnaires 
A negative impact on their business from Internet censorship is reported by 4 out of 5 
of member companies. It is a statement by The American Chamber of Commerce in Chi-
na [2]. Thus, the ultimate user effects of our seamless virtual network exploiting differen-
tially switched VPN were evaluated on GS attack. Thus, the following user level (i.e. ap-
plication level) questions were posed to 24 offshore companies of our clients in China: 
(1) Did you feel image/voice data delay (on such as during the onset of a GS block) in 
Web conferences? 
(2) Did you have stressful experiences of heavy response on connecting with offshore 
clouds? 
(3) Did you irritate in transferring large amounts of files such as CAD and Video data 
on GS? 
(4) Did you feel general inconvenience (causing business discontinuity) or incur high 
expense? 
Each item has the following selections: A. problems, B. small problems, C. no prob-
lem 
Results were as follows: 
(1) All but three companies answered as C (no problem). To the item 3, three compa-
nies answered as B and to the other items, they answered as C (no problem). 
(2) One of these three companies has its headquarters in Singapore, where the com-
munication channel itself is relatively poor. 
(3) Others have the contract with a service estimated or noted as minor clouds even 
on domestic usage in Japan. 
Thus, we had the 24 companies evaluate the suitability of the proposed method. Main-
ly seamless response was asked in multimedia communication necessary for Web confer-
ences among headquarters, branch offices, and offshore offices across the border. These 
results validated that our proposed method and system work well in offshore business 
37 
applications. With reasonable cost, the seamless international communication was real-
ized under some intentional restrictions. 
Generally, each country has multiple international channels for the Internet. Each 
channel has different speed depending on its route length as well as performance. If the 
national government finds inconvenient sites outside the country, some of international 
channels may be blocked step by step. Therefore, abrupt steep staircase increase of RTT 
occurs and business continuity is disrupted. Since this is a fairly general scenario, the pro-
posed method using differential calculus with the threshold adjusted can be adaptively 
applied for other than China. 
Though other type of shape may appear, a staircase shape RTT is seemingly the most 
difficult case to keep business continuity. Further, governments dare not to create more 
difficult shapes since their firewalling (GS block) is not targeting business continuity dis-
ruption. Thus we can expect RTT increases gradually in other shapes. Suppose RTT 
gradually and linearly increases always (e.g. 10ms per 360sec) to more than 300ms. It can 
be detected by the absolute threshold only before users notice heavy response. However, 
the proposed method has the absolute threshold also and differential thresholds can be 
invalid by relaxing it to 0. Thus, it can be expected to easily handle such somewhat grad-




6. RELATED WORK AND BACKGROUND 
Our method transfer data through bypass routes provided by the underlying IP network 
layer. Thus, it is taken as an overlay network. In other words, the bypass is managed not 
by network carriers (who may set up the blocks) but by users. Namely, the bypass is man-
aged by users’ intelligent routers who automatically switch to alternatives from blocked 
paths.  
A typical overlay network is a peer-to-peer (P2P) system. A peer can have a stable 
identity and neighbors in the overlay layer while changing continuously its IP address 
[16]. 
There are various P2Ps such as Bittorrent [14], Tor Project [18], and content deliv-
ery/distribution network (CDN [23]). Overlay networks such as CDN have many mirror 
sites to copy the redundant files. CDN distributes them from the optimal site, usually 
from the neighbor site. It is very efficient. However, it is expensive to maintain many 
mirror sites especially with the real-time synchronized update.  
VPN is also an overlay network. Various VPNs are available: IPSec [31] on Layer 3 
and L2TP [33] on Layer 2; PPTP [27] often used as a de-facto standard; SSL-VPN (VPN 
via SSL). Our system automatically switches to VPN to avoid blocks of public (open) 
Internet links and keep network response for offshore services. 
STT [17] is also an overlay network technology. STT is used in SDN (Software De-
fined Network) for network virtualization [32]. Network virtualization creates multiple 
virtual networks shared among multiple-tenants in a data center. Such virtualization by 
overlay networks is promising. Some overlay type network virtualization methods such as 
STT have dynamic switching functions. However, they are usually limited within data 
centers of homogeneous (same provider’s) AS. They do not easily work among heteroge-
neous (different provider’s /policy’s /goal’s) ASs across the border.  
Indeed, overlay network technologies are useful in alleviating the partitioning of the 
underlying IP networks. They can force more optimal routes or bypasses than optimal 
routes of public internet calculated by BGP etc. Recently, software-defined overlay by-
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pass methods using VPN have been proposed for Inter- and Intra-cloud Virtual Network-
ing [29]. They can avoid structural problems such as trombone routes [51][44]. 
Our method also uses VPN bypass. However, GS blocks let RTT extremely sharply 
increase in a steep staircase shape. Offshore business continuity needs not only automati-
cally detecting the onset of GS but also bypassing before users become aware of GS 
blocks. Our method exploits multiple threshold integrated differential calculus. This can 
recognize the steep staircase waveform of network delay by GS in the early stage before 
business users are aware of deterioration. Overlay network or VPN itself does not have 
such function. They can scarcely cope with predicting abrupt or steep staircase RTT in-
creases caused by intentional blocks such as GS.  
MON [25] is a multilayer overlay network against Denial-of-Service (DoS). In MON, 
DDME [28] monitors the packet rate of all the incoming flows. If the rate exceeds the 
threshold, packets of the flow are “punished” (i.e. dropped). However, this is not applica-
ble if attacks are performed to networks under no control of users as in GS. 
A stateless spread-spectrum paradigm [45] encodes data into hashes sent safely via 
multiple paths on overlay networks. Responsive multiple paths with hash coding are cost-
ly, while even one dedicated line to data centers in Japan [49] is costly. Our method uses 
just one VPN path, easily or alternately operated on censoring or deterioration. 
There is also a product, made by Yamaha NetVolante [57] which automatically diverts 
to the ISDN line prepared beforehand when the Internet is completely shut down due to 
malfunction of equipment etc. However, even while GS is in operation, the Internet is not 
shut down completely. Thus, it automatically diverts and it will not lead to stress reduc-
tion of Internet users. 
Recently, for traffic differentiation detection, NetPolice [56] or NVLens [55] compares 
the aggregate loss rates of each flow. It infers “network neutrality violations” in backbone 
ISPs. 
NANO [47] uses causal inference. DiffProbe [30] uses active queue management 
(AQM) such as random early detection (RED) and weighted fair queue. AQM comple-
ments Glasnost [20]. 
Monkey [10] takes a packet-level trace. It generates a trace of network-level properties 
such as latency and bandwidth. More recent work [15] infers higher-level protocols from 
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low-level packet traces. PlanetLab [43], RON [3], and NIMI [42] are measurement sys-
tems for researchers. 
Netalyzr [50] is a web-based tool to detect traffic blocking or content manipulation by 
a HTTP proxy. “Glasnost”, “Test Your ISP” Project [21], DIMES Project [48] and the 
Measurement Lab [36] help detect Internet blocks or differentiation by an easy-to-use 
interface. Network Diagnostic Test (NDT) [8] captures detailed connection statistics. To 
detect differentiation between applications, Glasnost collects RTT (round trip time), TCP 
throughput, UDP jitter and datagram loss, etc. Glasnost compares the throughput of a pair 
of flows to check differentiation. However, to overcome the noise interference, flows are 
running many times. This is expensive and subject to censoring. 
Measurement software [7] collects data by iPerf [38] and a ping tool. The iPerf 
measures TCP throughput/bandwidth and UDP data-loss/jitter. These many works focus 
on packet loss to detect traffic differentiation or blocks. Even the ping tool provides the 
minimum, maximum, and average of RTT (absolute value) to indicate packet loss. 
Meanwhile, our unique method uses first derivative on RTT to detect the abrupt/steep 
staircase latency increase that is typical of GS. 
In the past few years, cloud computing has provided many opportunities for enterpris-
es. It offers their customers a range of computing and networking services. Cloud compu-
ting frees enterprises and end users from specification details such as storage resources, 
computation limitation and networking cost. However, this becomes a problem for laten-
cy-sensitive (RTT dependent) applications. Such applications require nodes in the vicinity 
to meet strict delay thresholds. This also applies to situations like the China Golden 
Shield. Namely, the Internet latency seen by network nodes is controlled by an adversary, 
potentially disrupting the functionalities of applications.  
An emergent paradigm SDN separates control from data communication layers. SDN 
solves the problem of latency control inside the cloud. This is because it can control la-
tency between virtual addresses in the cloud by remapping such addresses to meet the 
latency thresholds. SDN latency control can be exploited for attacks [4]. Meanwhile, it 
can also be used to enforce uniform latency. [34] discuss how to provide open APIs to 
SDN routers for network-as-a-service application development. Their proposal does not 
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explicitly mention latency control. Nevertheless, it would allow writing applications to 
manage latency according to requirements. 
SDN may control distance and therefore latency between two virtual network interfac-
es in the cloud. Unfortunately, it cannot control latency on an external network interface 
between public internet and the cloud accessing IP addresses. A way to address this laten-
cy problem is fog computing [46]. 
In vehicular networks, fog computing is already used together with a (centralized or 
distributed) server capable of reconfiguring the mobile node addresses. Different from our 
RTT’s first derivatives are not used. But, “neighborhood” between addresses is managed 
by the server on the basis of the nodes relative position and speed. Therefore, the server 
can keep latency (RTT) between any two nodes as uniform as possible.  In principle, the 
same concept can be used to keep uniform latency on an overlay network even when la-
tency in the underlying IP layer is controlled by an attacker. 
A remapping and migration method for Cloud and Fog resource providers was pro-
posed by [41]. Their technique enforces application-defined end-to-end latency re-
strictions and reduces the network utilization by planning the remapping/migration ahead 
of time. Network intensive operators are placed on distributed fog devices while computa-
tionally intensive operators are in the cloud. 
At the moment there is little industrial support for this approach. Cisco has recently de-
livered their vision of fog computing. Devices already connected in the Internet of Things 
(IoT), run directly at the network’s edge. Customers can develop, manage and run soft-
ware applications on the Cisco IOx framework of networked devices. Networked devices 
include hardened routers, switches and IP video cameras. Cisco IOx brings the open 
source Linux and Cisco IOS network operating system together in a single networked 
device. They are brought together initially in routers. Latency control has not yet emerged 
as a goal in Cisco open application environment. However, it encourages more developers 
to bring their own applications and connectivity interfaces at the edge of the network es-
pecially for latency-sensitive applications [22].  
Latency-sensitive applications require meeting strict delay thresholds. As for such ap-
plications, VoIP communication is increasingly widespread on the global Net. However, 
VoIP voice quality suffers in highly non-isochronous environments. Such environments 
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exhibit high RTT variance. However, putting address remapping functionalities on the 
edge also raises some specific security concerns. This makes it easier to spoof IP address-
es and to perform Man-in-the-middle attacks. These have the potential to become a typi-
cal attack in Fog computing. Support for strong authentication must be provided. 
To alleviate this quality loss, many algorithms have been proposed to recognize and 
eliminate acoustic echo and noise. 
In [5], the performance of echo cancellation algorithms is analyzed in critically non-
isochronous environments. As a result, a PBEC (Packet-based Echo Canceller) approach 
has proved effective if the packet size satisfies a threshold. Their work also discusses the 
joint adoption of PBEC and an advanced Jitter Buffer. As mentioned in the section 5.1, 




Seamless virtual network technology was proposed as business solution towards eco-
nomic prosperity of developing countries. Differentially switched VPN bypass was uti-
lized. It avoided blocks of international bridging channels and continues business com-
munications. The seamless features were as follows: 
(1) the onset of GS blockage is recognized, exploiting the multiple threshold integra-
tion types of differential calculus combined with absolute (starting) threshold, 
(2) immediately followed by switching to the VPN bypass before serious network la-
tency starts. 
(3) Asymmetrically, the absolute (ending) threshold and continuation time (elapsed 
time) was used to determine the end of bypassing. 
This method was evaluated to be successful using around 200 cases of GS data (4 er-
rors out of 159 cases, around 2.5% false negative errors in 2015).  
In offshore applications, our method alleviated response time in Web conferences and 
throughput in business file transfer. As well, it solved the voice echo problems and jitters 
in Voice and Video that irritate business users. All of them were validated by question-
naires to our customers of 24 companies in their offshore business application usage.  
In many situations, governmental blocks on Internet links conflict with normal busi-
ness activity. In this paper, we argue that this situation is not exceptional, and has become 
part of regular (every 2-3 days) activity. Therefore, a way of coping with it must be 
found. We disclosed and improved the RTT-based method to detect the onset of blocks 
introduced by the Chinese GS system.  
Then, we presented and, more thoroughly, validated such an improved version of our 
most recent solution [24]: Network Virtualization Using VPN for Stable Communication 
with Offshore Cloud. This system is a concrete contribution towards preserving the func-
tionality of international business communication and economic activity under an inter-
mittent governmental block. This method has been applied to international communica-
tion channel in more than 20 offshore companies for three years. Also, this paper validat-
ed the effect of our solution over the operation of the set of application-level protocols 
44 
that can guarantee business continuity. The solution is believed to mitigate the negative 
impact of governmental interference in the operation of their communities’ links to the 
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